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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. ASPEN SKIING Co. v. ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP.: THE SUPREME
COURT UPHELD AN ANTITRUST DECISION AGAINST A MARKET-
DOMINANT COMPANY WHICH REFUSED TO
COOPERATE WITH A COMPETITOR
A. Introduction
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., I brings together fierce
competition, the Colorado ski industry, and the volatile field of antitrust
law. Currently in an uncertain state as a result of strong international
competition and governmental efforts to lessen the burden of regula-
tion,2 American antitrust law has had a long and tumultuous history,
beginning with deliberate policies of economic regulation formed in the
late nineteenth century. 3 Although possession of monopoly power by
itself will not generally constitute a violation of the Sherman Act's
prohibitions against restraint of trade,4 it is unclear to what extent cer-
tain activities or purposes will, when performed by a business possessing
1. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985), aff'g 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. The Reagan administration announced in February of 1986 that it would attempt
to ease some of the burden antitrust laws place on businesses, such as the provision that
treble damages can be awarded to the prevailing party in an antitrust action. This could be
accomplished by influencing Congress to pass legislation changing antitrust laws. Middle-
ton, New Antitrust Era Takes Shape, The National Law Journal, January 13, 1986, at 1.
3. Rapidly expanding railroads were accused of rate discrimination, illegal kickbacks,
and other unfair practices. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, Hear-
ing on S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1935). The nation's first antitrust statute, the
Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 in response to these accusations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982). The history and intricacies of antitrust law have captured the interest of many
scholars. For comprehensive analyses of antitrust law and its history, see H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw (1978).
An emerging position claims that all antitrust laws in general have been harmful to this
country. For example, see D. T. ARMENTENO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL
(1986).
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945) (in which general intent to maintain a market position which was a monopoly,
rather than specific intent to harm competitors, was found to be the basis for a section 2
violation, suggesting that mere monopoly power could constitute such a violation); United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (where it was implied that,
had the applicable market been more narrowly defined, duPont's 75% market share of that
narrower market alone could have provided the basis for a section 2 violation).
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monopoly power in a defined market, combine to become a violation of
the Act. 5 Aspen Skiing Co., the first monopolization case since 1973,6 dis-
cussed and further defined one area of business conduct which may, in
combination with monopoly power, violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act: the refusal to deal with competitors. Affirming both the Tenth Cir-
cuit and the Federal District Court, a unanimous Supreme Court found
the conduct of Aspen Skiing Company, in concert with its partial mo-




Aspen, Colorado boasts four superb facilities for downhill skiing.
Aspen Highlands, Aspen Mountain (Ajax), and Buttermilk were devel-
oped into ski resorts by private developers between 1945 and 1960.
Aspen Skiing Company (Aspen) purchased Ajax and Buttermilk, then
developed a fourth ski area, Snowmass, which opened in 1967. Aspen
Highlands is still owned and operated by an independent company,
Aspen Highlands Corporation (Highlands).
From 1962 until 1978, with one exception, joint passes were sold
which allowed a skier to ski any of the four mountains during a limited
time period. For all but the 1977-1978 season, revenues from the sale
of these "all-Aspen" tickets were divided among the four ski areas based
on usage of each area.8 Various methods were used to determine how
many skiers with the "all-Aspen" ticket used each mountain.
For the 1977-1978 season, Aspen offered to continue the "all-
5. Developmental cases involving section 2 violations include: United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The reasoning of these cases culminated in a monopolization
test introduced in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), which has re-
mained the standard for over twenty years.
6. Travers, Does a Monopolist Have a Duty to Deal with its Rivals? Some Thoughts on the
Aspen Skiing Case, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 727 (1986); Note, The Monopolist's Duty to Cooperate in
Joint Marketing Ventures with Competitors: The Quandry ofAspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1243, 1256 (1986) (hereafter cited as "The Monopolist's
Duty") (Aspen Skiing is the first Supreme Court section 2 monopolization case since Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
7. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). For other commentaries and discussions of the sub-
ject case, see Malina, Supreme Court Update, 54 ANTrTRUST L.J. 280, 289-90 (1985) ("possibly
the most significant decision of the October 1984 Term"); The Monopolist's Duty, supra note
6; Travers, supra note 6; Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 275-83 (1985). For a thor-
ough analysis of monopolies, including a review of the subject case, see Cirace, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 677 (1986).
8. Various methods were used to determine the usage of each ski area. For the
1971-72 season, an all-Aspen ticket was monitored by lift operators recording the ticket
numbers of persons using the slopes of Highlands. For the 1973-74 season, a random-
sample survey was commissioned to determine how many skiers with the four-area ski
ticket used each mountain. The ski areas allocated revenues from the ticket sales based on
the survey's results. Highland's share of those revenues was 17.5% in 1973-74; 18.5% in
1974-75; 16.8% in 1975-76 and; 13.2% in 1976-77. Highlands' measured share of the
total market was 15.8% in 1973-74; 17.1% in 1974-75; 17.4% in 1975-76 and; 20.5% in
1976-77. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2851.
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Aspen" ticket only if Highlands would accept a fixed share of the ticket
revenues. Fearing that the alternative might be no joint ticket at all, and
hoping to persuade Aspen to reinstate the division of revenues based on
use of each facility, Highlands eventually accepted a fixed percentage of
revenues for the 1977-1978 season.9 That season, however, was the last
for the "all-Aspen" ticket.
Aspen ended its cooperation with Highlands by eliminating the "all-
Aspen" ticket.' 0 The company began to market its own three-area ski
package featuring only its own mountains. In addition, Aspen took
other actions1' which made it extremely difficult for Highlands to mar-
ket its own multi-area package to replace the joint "all-Aspen" ski ticket.
Highlands' market share for downhill skiing services declined stead-
ily after the "all-Aspen" ticket based on usage was abolished. 12 In 1979,
Highlands brought suit in the Federal District Court of Colorado, alleg-
ing antitrust violations by Aspen of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
C. The Federal District Court Decision
In her instructions to the jury, District Judge Zita Weinshienk de-
fined monopolization by use of the two-part test developed in United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 13 for determining section 2 violations of the Act. 14
The offense of monopolization consists of: "(1) the possession of mo-
nopoly power in a relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition, main-
tenance, or use of that power by anticompetitive or exclusionary means
or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes." 15 The jury instruc-
tions further read:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-com-
petitive or exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here be-
tween practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition
on the one hand and the success of a business which reflects
only a superior product, a well-run business, or luck, on the
other hand. 
16
9. Highlands accepted 15% of the revenues for the 1977-78 season. No survey was
made during that ski season to determine actual usage of Highlands. Id. at 2852.
10. Aspen and Highlands were unable to reach an agreement for the 1978-79 ski sea-
son. Indeed, a member of Aspen's Board of Directors had advocated making Highlands
"an offer that [it] could not accept." Id.
11. These actions included: 1) an advertising campaign strongly implying that Ajax,
Buttermilk and Snowmass were the only ski mountains in the Aspen, Colorado area; 2) re-
fusal to sell Highlands any lift tickets for Aspen's mountains, either at the tour operator's
discount or at retail and; 3) refusal to accept vouchers from Highlands' newly developed
"Adventure Pack," an alternative ski package consisting of a 3-day pass at Highlands and
three vouchers, each equal to the price of a daily lift ticket at an Aspen mountain. The
vouchers were guaranteed by funds on deposit in a local bank, and were redeemable by
local merchants at full value. Id. at 2853.
12. Highlands' share of the market for downhill skiing services was 20.5% in 1976-77;
15.7% in 1977-78; 13.1% in 1978-79; 12.5% in 1979-80 and; 11% in 1980-81. Id.
13. 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see also Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 276; The Monopolist's
Duty, supra note 6, at 1258; Travers, supra note 6, at 730 (discussing the Grinnell test and its
background).
14. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854.
15. Id. at 2855; Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
16. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854.
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The Sherman Act provides for treble damages. Thejury found Aspen in
violation of section 2 of the Act and calculated Highlands' actual dam-
ages at $2.5 million. As sought in Highlands' complaint, treble damages
of $7.5 million and attorney's fees were awarded.
17
D. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal before the Tenth Circuit, Aspen argued that the effect of
the District Court's decision was to hold that businesses have a duty to
deal or cooperate with their competitors.' 8 The Tenth Circuit ex-
amined this argument in some depth, admitting that defining those in-
stances in which a monopolist has a duty to cooperate with its
competitors is "one of the most 'unsettled and vexatious' issues in anti-
trust law."' 19 The court, citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., recog-
nized two lines of cases defining circumstances in which the duty to deal
with competitors might be imposed by law:20 cases involving essential
facilities and cases demonstrating an intent to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly by refusing to deal with competitors.
2 1
The essential facilities or "bottleneck" theory of antitrust law in-
volves control of facilities essential to the operation of an industry within
a market area. 22 For example, when railroad companies jointly owned a
terminal facility that was the only feasible terminal in a city, the owners
were required to make the facility available to non-proprietor railroads
on non-discriminatory and reasonable terms. 2 3 In analyzing the facts of
Aspen Skiing Co. under the bottleneck theory, the Tenth Circuit noted
Aspen's ownership of three out of the four ski mountains in the defined
area market; the difficulty and high cost of entry into the market by de-
veloping a new ski area; Aspen's lack of cooperation with Highlands on
ticketing arrangements amounting to a denial of the use of the facility
even though only partially monopolized; and evidence that joint market-
ing arrangements for ski tickets was both feasible and profitable. 2 4 The
court concluded that the essential facilities analysis was applicable and
established a duty to deal on the part of Aspen.
25
The court then turned briefly to the second possible basis for such a
duty: intent. It stated that "a 'business is free to deal with whomever it
pleases so long as it has no purpose to create or maintain a monop-
17. Id.
18. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1518-20.
19. Id. at 1519 (quoting Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir.
1980)).
20. Id.
21. The court, in concluding that both lines of reasoning applied to the case before
them, noted other cases where a duty to deal was found based on both theories, or gener-
ally, without distinguishing between the two. Id. at 1520 n.13.
22. Id. at 1520.
23. Id. (citing United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912)).
24. The court followed the four-part analysis of liability under the bottleneck theory
promoted in MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983). Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1520.
25. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d at 1521.
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oly.' "26 The court here, however, held the evidence sufficient for ajury
to find an intent to monopolize from Aspen's conduct. Factors listed as
influential were Aspen's refusal to cooperate with Highlands on a joint
ski ticket program, Aspen's refusal to honor Highlands' "Adventure
Pack" vouchers despite bank guarantees; and Aspen's raising of lift
ticket prices, thwarting any future modification of the "Adventure Pack"
idea.27 The trial court's decision was upheld, as were awards of triple
damages2 8 and attorney's fees.
E. The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the eight-justice unanimous opinion 29 for the
Supreme Court, affirming the Tenth Circuit decision. The opinion cov-
ered the facts in depth, underscoring those actions taken by Aspen Ski-
ing Company that adversely affected Highlands.
The issue, as defined by the Supreme Court, was whether the jury
finding of a section 2 violation was erroneous as a matter of law because
it was based on the premise that those with monopoly power have a duty
to cooperate with their competitors.30 The Court found that, in light of
District Judge Weinshienk's instructions, 3 1 the jury verdict was not based
on any assumption of a duty to deal.
3 2
However, the Court held that the general right to refuse to deal
with others is not unqualified. 3 3 The opinion then discussed LorainJour-
nal v. United States.34 In Lorain, the only local newspaper disseminating
news and advertising in a small Ohio town, refused to sell advertising to
persons who patronized a competing radio station.3 5 In holding that
this conduct violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
said that the Journal's right to select customers and refuse advertise-
26. Id. at 1519 (citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir.
1980) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919))).
27. Id. at 1521-22.
28. The court also discussed in some detail Aspen's arguments against the injury and
damages findings, id. at 1523-27, but held that the evidence was sufficient for ajury finding
of lost revenues, and that the damages were reasonably estimated, in fact well under the
estimates given by two expert witnesses. Id. at 1527.
29. Justice White took no part in the consideration of this case.
30. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2849. The tension between the Sherman Act's major
provisions becomes apparent in considering a general duty to cooperate with competitors.
An interpretation of section 2 requiring cooperation, could in some instances lead to a
violation of section l's prohibition of combinations "in restraint of trade." See supra note
4. It is interesting to note that in 1975, just four years before the institution of this suit,
the Attorney General of Colorado brought a federal antitrust suit against both Aspen and
Highlands, challenging, among other things, the joint ticket offered by the two companies.
The suit was settled by a consent decree which subjected the sale of the "all-Aspen" ticket
to certain restrictions. The irony of the two actions emphasizes the complexity and flexi-
bility of antitrust theories. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 280 n.43 (noting conflicts
between the Sherman Act's section 1 proscriptions against competitor cooperation and the
possible scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision in defining a duty to deal with competitors).
31. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
32. Id. at 2856.
33. Id. at 2857.
34. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
35. Id. at 153.
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ments was a qualified one. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain
a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
'36
The Court emphasized that Aspen did not reject a new proposal by
a competitor, but "elected to make an important change in a pattern of
distribution that had originated in a competitive market."13 7 Because the
jury instructions allowed for a possibility of monopoly based on business
superiority alone, the Court assumed that the jury, in following the in-
structions, found no valid business reasons for Aspen's refusal to deal
with Highlands.3 8 In reviewing the record for support of the the jury's
conclusions, the Court looked beyond the effect on Highlands alone to
the effect on consumers and the market. Factors the Court highlighted
in its review were consumer preference for the four-mountain "all-
Aspen" pass; the decline of Highland's market share despite their miti-
gatory measures; Aspen's willingness to forego sales from Highlands of
Aspen's own tickets or of vouchers from Highland's "Adventure Packs"
without a valid business justification; and Aspen's failure to convince the
jury that the "all-Aspen" pass was a problem to administer.3 9 The
Court concluded that the record supported the jury's finding that
Aspen's efforts were "a deliberate effort to discourage customers from




The Supreme Court, while affirming the Tenth Circuit decision, did
not analyze the case based on the essential facilities or "bottleneck" the-
ory of a duty to deal with competitors. This doctrine was crucial to the
Tenth Circuit's opinion. However, without identifying a particular stan-
dard, the Court's analysis did utilize an intent theory,4 2 emphasizing
Aspen's justifications, or lack of valid justifications, for its actions in re-
fusing to deal with Highlands on the "all-Aspen" ticket. 4 3 This focus on
36. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2857 (quoting Lorain, 342 U.S. at 155 (quoting
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919))).
37. Id. at 2858; but see Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 279; The Monopolist's Duty, supra
note 6, at 1262 (suggesting that the scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision could extend to
new ventures promoted by competitors).
38. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2858-59; see Malina, supra note 7 (If a refusal to deal
changes "the character of the market," and is therefore illegal, it would be a "harsh rule
indeed.").
39. Aspen Skiing Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2859-61.
40. Id. at 2861.
41. Id.
42. See Travers, supra note 6, at 741; Malina, supra note 7.
43. See Malina, supra note 7 (absence ofjustification by Aspen is the key to the Court's
unanimity); The Monopolist's Duty, supra note 6, at 1246-49 (justification for a monopolist's
refusal to deal with competitors is the dividing line between the right to deal with whom-
ever one wants and a violation of section 2). But see Travers, supra note 6, at 742 (The
Court did not differentiate between Aspen's refusal to continue the "all-Aspen" ticket and




intent alone may serve to further limit the use of the essential facilities
theory, 44 or may simply be an indication that intent is the common nu-
cleus of both tests, since valid business-based justifications may serve to
absolve a monopolist of section 2 wrong-doing in either instance.
4 5 If
intent to monopolize is to be the focal point of any analysis of a duty to
deal with one's rivals, it is unlikely that such a duty would be applied in
cases of new ventures offered to market monopolists4 6 unless specific
intent on the part of key actors could be proved. Without a history of
conduct leading to a monopoly, such as found in Aspen Skiing Co., and
without a past cooperative record to show the disparity of proferedjusti-
fications for a monopolist's actions, proof of intent to monopolize would
be difficult. Therefore, the scope of the Aspen Skiing Co. decision may be
limited to situations involving on-going business dealings.
II. FDIC V. PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP.: THE SUPREME COURT HELD A
STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT IS NOT AN FDIC-INSURED DEPOSIT
A. Introduction
Banks are now failing at a faster rate than at any time since the
"Great Depression."'4 7 Many banks are in jeopardy because of the twin
onslaughts of the depressed agricultural and oil industries. 4 8 Failure of
the infamous Penn Square Bank4 9 led to litigation which culminated in
this case.
Due to the importance of maintaining public confidence in the
banking system at all times, Congress has created federal safeguards in
order to protect depositors' earnings in the event of a bank failure.
When the Comptroller of the Currency declares a federal bank insol-
vent, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is appointed as
the receiver. 50 Each depositor is insured by the FDIC for the amount of
deposit up to the statutory limit, which is now $100,000.5 1 In FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp. ,52 the issue was whether a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note is a "deposit" which would be
44. See Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 283 (essential facilities doctrine limited to situa-
tions where more than one competitor controls the facility).
45. But see Travers, supra note 6 ("intent" adds nothing to conduct).
46. See supra note 38.
47. See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1986, p.31.
48. Id.
49. When the Penn Square Bank was declared insolvent onJuly 5, 1982, the FDIC, for
only the third time in its history, had to create a special bank in order to refund deposits.
Investors of the insolvent bank immediately moved to block redemption of letters of
credit. Legal Times Washington, July 12, 1828, at 1, col. 2. See generally, Note, The After-
math of Penn Square Bank: Protecting Loan Participants from Setoffs, 18 TULSA L.J. 261 (1982).
The Penn Square probe eventually became a criminal investigation. L.A. DailyJ., Sept. 29,
1982, at 5, col. 5.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. IV 1980). The FDIC was established by the Banking Act
of 1933. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 168. These provisions were revised in 1950 and
are currently codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1982).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1982) sets forth $100,000 as the maximum amount gener-
ally insured by the FDIC for any single depositor at a given bank.
52. 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
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insured by the FDIC. 53 The U.S. District Court 54 and the Tenth Circuit
55 both held that such a note is an FDIC-insured deposit. The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
B. Facts
Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) produced pumping
equipment for use in the oil fields of Oklahoma and Texas. Philadelphia
Gear is a trade supplier which furnished major parts for Orion's equip-
ment. Penn Square Bank was a federal bank in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
Orion had requested Penn Square Bank to issue an irrevocable
standby letter of credit for $145,200 for the benefit of Philadelphia
Gear. The purpose of this letter of credit was to allow Philadelphia Gear
easy and reliable access to any money owed to it by Orion. As security
for the letter of credit, Orion agreed to execute an unsecured promis-
sory note in favor of Penn Square Bank for the same amount. Both the
letter of credit and the note were executed on April 23, 1981.56
The letter of credit was contingent upon certain events. Philadel-
phia Gear was required to present a "signed statement that [it had] in-
voiced Orion Manufacturing Corporation and that said invoices have
remained unpaid for at least fifteen (15) days" 57 in order to receive pay-
ment from Penn Square. The bank would then pay Philadelphia Gear,
and charge interest to Orion Manufacturing Corporation for the amount
borrowed.58
Penn Square was declared insolvent on July 5, 1982.59 The FDIC,
as receiver and liquidator of the bank, received drafts from Philadelphia
Gear on the letter of credit in excess of $700,000.60 The FDIC disaf-
53. The volume of material concerning letters of credit is large and growing. See gener-
ally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 8-1 to -80
(rev. ed. 1981);J. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDrr (1984); H. HARFIELD, LETrERS
OF CREDIT (1979);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAWS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 104-53 (2d ed. 1980). Pertinent law review articles on the subject of
standby letters of credit include Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit - The Contro-
versy Continues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272 (1978); Garma, Standby Letters of Credit and Guarantees: Do
We Understand What We're Doing, 1978J. COM. BANK LENDING 3 (1978); Harfield, The Standby
Letter of Credit Debate, 94 BANKING L.J. 293 (1977); Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate
- The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697 (1975); Comment, The Standby
Letter of Credit: What It Is and How to Use It, 45 MONTANA L. REV. 71 (1984). For a thoughtful
treatment of the history and proper interpretation of whether standby letters of credit
should be treated as federally insured deposits, see Note, Standby Letters of Credit: Are They
Insured Deposits?, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1165 (1986) (concluding that standby letters were
never intended to be federally insured).
54. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1984), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
55. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
1931 (1986).
56. Id. at 1133.
57. Id.
58. ld. at 1135.
59. Id.
60. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1933. Philadelphia Gear maintained that Penn
Square Bank owed $724,728.50 on the standby letter of credit. Of that amount,
[Vol. 64:2
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firmed "any and all" obligations under the letter of credit and returned
the drafts unpaid, declaring that the letter of credit was not a "de-
posit." 6 ' Litigation ensued.
C. The Federal District Court Decision
This case was tried before Judge Lee T. West of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 6 2 Judge West
found the deposits to be FDIC-insured and ordered the FDIC to pay
Philadelphia Gear $100,000 in its capacity as insurer and $45,200 in its
capacity as receiver. In response to post-trial motions, the court denied
an award of attorney's fees to Philadelphia Gear. 63
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the FDIC advanced three arguments justifying its posi-
tion that section 1813(l)(1) should not be interpreted to include standby
letters of credit. First, a standby letter of credit fails to satisfy the defini-
tion of "deposit" that is contained in section 1813(l)(1) because it is not
"money or its equivalent." 64 Since Philadelphia Gear could not present
the letter of credit to Penn Square Bank unless Orion did not pay cur-
rent invoices, this contingent letter of credit did not create the uncondi-
tional obligation which is the essential element of "money or its
equivalent." Second, this standby letter of credit was not "money or its
equivalent" because the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn
Square Bank as a security was accompanied not by cash, but a mere
promise to pay in the event the letter of credit was presented to the
bank. Third, a standby letter of credit is not an obligation for which the
bank is "primarily" liable, because standby letters of credit represent
secondary liabilities. 65 The FDIC asserted that because it is charged
with administering the provisions of the statute referring to letters of
credit, and had always interpreted section 1813(l)(1) as excluding
$100,000.00 was claimed to be federally insured, with $624,728.50 remaining as the unin-
sured outstanding balance. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1133.
61. Id. at 1134.
62. The actual case was not published in the Federal Supplement. What was pub-
lished was the court's opinion in response to two post-trial motions. Philadelphia Gear, 587
F. Supp. at 297.
63. Id. at 302.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982). This section of the Act defines a "deposit" as:
The unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the
usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit,
either conditionally or unconditionally . . . which is evidenced by ... a letter of
credit ... on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the
generality of the term 'money or its equivalent,' any such account or instrument
must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when
credited or issued in exchange for ... a promissory note upon which the person
obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable. ...
(emphasis in original)
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the FDIC's contention that the note that Orion executed
in favor of Penn Square Bank was not a "promissory note" within the meaning of U.C.C.
§ 3-104(l)(b) (1978), because it did not represent an unconditional promise to pay. Phila-
delphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134-35.
65. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1135.
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standby letters of credit, its interpretation of the statute was entitled to
substantial deference.66
The Tenth Circuit rejected all three arguments. Judge Logan wrote
the opinion. While acknowledging that courts often accord deference to
the interpretations that an administrative agency gives a federal stat-
ute,6 7 the court also pointed out the circumstances under which such
interpretations can be disregarded.6 8 The court found no evidence that
Congress had expressly delegated authority to the FDIC to refine the
statutory definition of "deposit", and chose to disregard the FDIC's
interpretation.
With regard to the FDIC's second argument, the court examined
the difference between the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn
Square Bank and the agreement between Orion and Philadelphia Gear
creating the standby letter of credit. The court stated that the negotia-
bility of an instrument such as a promissory note must be determined by
examining the face of the document that Orion gave to Penn Square
Bank without regard to extraneous documents. 69 The court found that
the terms of the agreement between Orion and Philadelphia Gear were
not contained in the agreement between Orion and Penn Square Bank.
Therefore, concluded the court, no conditions restricting the negotiabil-
ity of the letter of credit were present, and the letter of credit was found
to be "money or its equivalent."
70
The FDIC finally argued that the structure of section 181771 ex-
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1982). The definition of "deposit" found in section 1813(l)(1)
is based upon the former Regulation I, Rule 1, Oct. 1, 1935, 12 C.F.R. § 301.1 (1939),
revoked after incorporation into statutory law, 12 C.F.R. § 234 (Supp. 1962). That Congress
incorporated the FDIC regulatory definition of "deposit" into the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act amendments in 1960 lends credence to the validity of the FDIC interpretation.
Pub. L. No. 86-671, 74 Star. 546 (1960) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (1982)). In
addition, although the FDIC issued no regulations excluding standby letters of credit from
the regulatory definition of "deposit," there is some indication that FDIC officials in 1935
thought that they were excluded. One official, when asked whether a letter of credit was a
deposit, stated:
If your letter of credit is issued by a charge against the depositor's account or for
cash and the letter of credit is reflected on your books as a liability, you do have a
deposit liability. If, on the other hand, you merely extend a line of credit to your
customer, you will only show a contingent liability on your books. In that event
no deposit liability has been created.
FDIC v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoted in Philadelphia
Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938); see alsoJ. DOLAN, THE LAw OF LErrERS OF CREDIT 12.02(1)(a) at
12-2 to 4 (1984) ("[I]n the FDIC's view, the beneficiary of a standby credit does not have a
provable claim.").
67. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (judicial deference granted to interpretation of administrative
agencies is often appropriate).
68. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1135. In deciding the degree ofjudicial deference to
attach to an administrative interpretation, courts should consider the thoroughness of the
agency's research, the validity of its reasoning, and how consistent such an interpretation
is to prior and subsequent agency pronouncements. Adams Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 284 n.5 (1978).
69. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134; see U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1978) & Official
Comments.
70. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134-35.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
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cludes standby letters from the scope of section 1813(l)(1)'s definitions
of "deposit." Section 1817 establishes guidelines for determining the
amount each member bank is assessed for insurance. Member banks are
required to report to the FDIC their total deposit liabilities that would
be "absolutely due and owing in the event of a bank failure." 7 2 Because
standby letters of credit are contingent, they do not fall into the category
of an absolute obligation that member banks are required to report.
Therefore, maintained the FDIC, even though section 1817(4) refers to
section 1813 for its definitions of "deposit," it could not include a
standby letter of credit as a deposit upon which insurance rates are as-
sessed. The court rejected this line of reasoning, finding no support in
the language or legislative history of section 1817.
7 3
The Tenth Circuit's decision upheld the judgment against the FDIC
for $100,000 based on the FDIC's status as insurer, and for $45,200
based on the FDIC's status as receiver. 74 The decision also overruled an
award of prejudgment interest, stating that the FDIC was immune to
such judgments because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 7 5
E. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stressed the history of banking
regulation and insurance in this country. Her opinion referred to legis-
lative history in order to assert that the purpose of the FDIC has been to
protect the "assets and 'hard earnings' that businesses and individuals
have entrusted to banks."' 76 She stated that this purpose "is not fur-
thered by extending deposit insurance to cover a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note, which involves no such surren-
der of assets or hard earnings to the custody of the bank."' 77
The FDIC had argued that it provides insurance based only on the
amount of deposits in a bank, and that the FDIC has not included in its
computation of deposits the amount of standby letters of credit backed
by contingent promissory notes. 78 Although this argument failed to
persuade the Tenth Circuit, it found a more receptive audience in the
Supreme Court.
Noting that in 1950 Congress had reenacted the provisions of the
Banking Act of 1935 without alteration, the Court relied on the maxim
of statutory construction that reenactment of a statute without change
72. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1137.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1140.
75. Id. at 1138-39.
76. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936. See S. REP. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7,
10 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3234.
77. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1936.
78. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1138. The FDIC also does not include standby let-
ters of credit in its computation of the premiums it charges member banks. Philadelphia
Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938. In 1985, standby letters of credit represented potential obliga-
tions of more than $137 billion. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1985, at 46, col. 4.
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signals congressional approval of whatever interpretations its terms had
received. 79 The Court acknowledged that the FDIC's interpretation of
the statute defining "deposit" had never been reduced to a specific reg-
ulation. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that in the circumstances of
this case the FDIC's "practice and belief" that a standby letter of credit
backed by a contingent promissory note does not create a "deposit"
within the meaning of the statute was entitled to the "considerable
weight [that] should be accorded to an executive department's construc-
tion of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." °8 0 Based on
this, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and
the Tenth Circuit Court, holding that a standby letter of credit backed
by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to an insured
deposit.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, authored by Justice Marshall, acknowledged that there
was considerable common sense backing the Court's opinion.8 1 Never-
theless, Justice Marshall maintained that in order to reach its result, the
majority had to read qualifications into the statute that did not appear
there. In so doing, Justice Marshall claimed that the majority ignored
settled principles of banking law and created distinctions that were sup-
ported neither by the plain meaning of the statute nor by its legislative
history.8 2 The dissent cited another Tenth Circuit case analyzed here,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp. ,83
for the proposition that "when the ingenuity of businessmen creates
transactions and corporate forms that were perhaps not contemplated
by Congress, the courts must enforce the statutes that Congress has en-
acted."'8 4 Accordingly, argued Justice Marshall, section 1813(l)(1) as
written does not recognize the distinction between a commercial and a
standby letter of credit. While such a distinction might be worthwhile,
79. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275
(1974).
80. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938-39 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). Unlike a standby letter of credit,
a commercial letter of credit is without question a federally insured deposit. FDIC v. Ir-
ving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). A commercial letter of credit differs
from a standby letter of credit in another important respect. Banks that issue commercial
letters of credit expect that the beneficiary will present the letter to the bank no matter
how smoothly the underlying transaction proceeds. See B. CLARK, supra note 53, 8.2, at
8-5. By contrast, banks that issue a standby letter of credit do not expect the beneficiary to
present the letter to the bank for payment unless the party to whom the letter is issued is
unable to pay. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 713 (1980);Justice, Letters of
Credit: Expectations and Frustrations - Part 1, 94 BANKING L.J. 424,430-31 (1977). In fact, only
about 2% of all standby letters of credit are ever presented for payment. See Lloyd-Davies,
Survey of Standby Letters of Credit, 65 FED. RESERVE BULL. 716, 717 (1979).
81. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1939 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even before the Federal Deposit Insurance Act was
promulgated, it had long been recognized that a promissory note whose obligation to pay
was contingent must appear so on the face of the note rather than by resort to extraneous
documents. SeeJ. THORNDIKE, STORY ON PROMISSORY NOTES 34 (7th ed. 1878).
83. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
84. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1939 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall concluded, it is up to Congress, not the FDIC or the
Court, to make such a decision. 85 Therefore, the dissent would have
affirmed the lower court's inclusion of standby letters of credit within
the definition of section 1813(l)(1).
Justice Marshall also objected to the majority's characterization of
the promissory note that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank as a "contin-
gent" obligation that rendered it non-negotiable. He felt that no imped-
iments to immediate enforceability appeared on the face of the note, and
that the note therefore represented an unconditional promise to pay,
which satisfied the requirements of full negotiability under the Uniform
Commercial Code and Oklahoma law.8 6 As an example, Justice Mar-
shall observed that if the note that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank had
somehow been assigned to another, then Orion would have been re-
quired to honor it. 8 7 Justice Marshall concluded that the majority lacked
judicial restraint by interpreting section 1813(l)(1) not as it was written,
but how the majority would like it to be.
88
F. Analysis and Conculsion
The Supreme Court was faced with the thankless task of interpret-
ing a legislative scheme that failed to anticipate its own ambiguity, much
less offer guidance through legislative history. By deciding that standby
letters of credit are not insurable deposits within the meaning of section
1813()(1), the Court succumbed to the temptation to make rather than
interpret law. Professor Tribe has described this tendency as the
Court's "persistent willingness to hear legal music in the sounds of si-
lence." 89 In the process, it overruled a Tenth Circuit opinion that
demonstrated good sense as well as commendable judicial restraint.
The Court acknowledged that the FDIC's interpretation of "de-
posit" is not expressed in any formal regulation, but nevertheless ar-
gued that Congress adopted its interpretation by reenacting the law
without alteration in 1950.90 The Court conceded that the document
that Orion gave to Penn Square Bank not only bore a facial resemblance
to, but also satisfied the Oklahoma statutory requirements of a promis-
sory note. Even so, the Court concluded that the document cannot be
considered a promissory note for purposes of federal insurance law be-
cause of its contingent nature. 9 1
A literal reading of section 1813(l)(1) supports the contention of
the Tenth Circuit that standby letters of credit, like commercial letters of
credit, should be treated as federally insured deposits. Section
1813(l)(1) defines a "deposit" as:
85. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1940 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1978); O.A. STAT. tit.
12A, § 3-104(1) (1978).
87. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. L. TRIBE, CONSTITu-IONAL CHOICES 30 (1985).
90. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937.
91. Id. at 1934.
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[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or
held by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it
has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or uncondi-
tionally... which is evidenced by . . . a letter of credit ... on which
the bank is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limiting the
generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such...
instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the
equivalent of money when issued in exchange ... for a promissory
note upon which the person obtaining any such.., instrument
is primarily or secondarily liable.
9 2
Therefore, since a standby letter of credit is by definition an obligation
on the part of a bank which is conditional upon the inability of its cus-
tomer to pay, it would appear that a standby letter of credit would rest
within the ambit of section 1813(l)(1). 93 Although the Supreme Court
properly recognized that the springboard of statutory construction is the
language of the law in question, it chose to place greater weight upon
the informal interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing the
statute then upon a reading of the statute itself.9 4 Because neither inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of protecting the
earnings of depositors, the more constricted reading that the Supreme
Court gave to section 1813(l)(1) seems uncalled for.
The dissenting trio was composed of Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Rehnquist. Although it may seem strange to see Justice Rehnquist
joining such an alliance, he remains faithful to the strict constructionist
philosophy - rule on the basis of what the law states, not on what he
might like the law to be - which earned him recent appointment as
ChiefJustice. As the dissent noted, Philadelphia Gear's status as an in-
sured depositor depends upon the terms of the underlying repayment
agreement between Orion Manufacturing and Penn Square Bank. Ordi-
narily, the beneficiary of a letter of credit would pay no attention to the
terms of the agreement between the issuing bank and its customer be-
cause the nature of letters of credit are such that issuing banks merely
examine the face of the letter when it is presented. 9 5 However, with this
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Regulation H of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
which defines a standby letter of credit as one "which represents an obligation to the bene-
ficiary on the part of the issuer... (3) to make payment on account of any default by the
account party in the performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(1) (1977). One
observer has analyzed this passage of section 1813(l)(1) and come to the conclusion that
the phrase "conditionally or unconditionally" does not modify the words "is obligated to
give credit;" instead, maintains the writer, it refers to the presence or absence of a require-
ment that the beneficiary of a letter of credit present certain documents when demanding
payment. As such, it would not include standby letters of credit in the definition of "de-
posit." See Note, supra note 53, at 1182. While this argument has some merit, it presumes
that Congress intended to use the phrase "is obligated to give credit, conditionally or
unconditionally" in a technical sense rather than deriving its meaning from the words in
their ordinary usage. In the absence of an indication to the contrary in the legislative
history of section 1813(l)(1), it makes more intuitive sense to adopt the straightforward
construction given to the statute by the Tenth Circuit. See Phild4elphia Gear, 751 F.2d at
1137.
94. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1938-39.
95. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937-38.
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opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between com-
mercial and standby letters of credit for purposes of federal deposit in-
surance coverage. 9 6 Companies and their lawyers need to note this, and
to adjust accordingly so that they will not find themselves in Philadel-
phia Gear's predicament.
9 7
III. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM V.
DIMENSION FINANCIAL CORP.: THE SUPREME COURT SETS ASIDE
A FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD RULE REGULATING
"NONBANK" FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS
BANKS
A. Introduction
The Federal Reserve Board has regulatory authority over any com-
pany controlling an institution that is defined as a "bank" by the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956. 98 This holding company regulation is in
addition to the regulations imposed on banks themselves. 99 By taking
advantage of a definitional loophole in the statute, many financial insti-
tutions had successfully placed themselves outside of the narrow defini-
tion of a "bank" so that their holding companies could escape the
onerous regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. 0 0 In an effort to
reduce the competitive advantages enjoyed by those institutions outside
the purview of the Bank Holding Company Act,' 0 1 the Federal Reserve
Board promulgated rules that expanded the definition of a "bank" to
96. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1978) & Official Comment 1. Justice Marshall found it
anomalous to require reference to the terms of the agreement between the bank and its
customer in order to determine the insurability of a letter of credit, because frequently the
beneficiary neither knows nor cares what those terms are. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at
1941 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1940-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982) (defining
bank holding company); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (defining banks).
99. Although nonbank institutions are treated as banks for purposes of most of the
Title 12 provisions of the United States Code, their holding companies can successfully
dodge the second layer of regulation that is imposed on bank holding companies if the
institution they control does not meet the narrow statutory definition of a "bank" that is
found in section 1841(c) of Title 12. Note, The Demise of the Bank-Nonbank distinction: An
Argument for Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 653-
54 (1985).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982), as amended, defines a "bank" as any institution which
"(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans." Ifa "bank" does not meet both
parts of the definitional test, its holding company will not be subject to the Act. Id.
101. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank holding companies are subject to
stringent application requirements to acquire a bank, see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-(c) (1982);
extensive financial reporting requirements, see 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) and (c) (1982); exami-
nation and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board, see 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (1982);
minimum capital requirement at the holding company level, see 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984);
and requirements that they engage in only a narrow range of nonbanking activities
deemed by the Federal Reserve Board to be closely related to banking and which must
reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, see 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1982).
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include many of these "nonbank" financial institutions. 10 2 In Dimension
Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 10 3 the
Tenth Circuit invalidated the Board's attempt to regulate these nonbank
financial institutions. 10 4 The Supreme Court's affirmation' 0 5 of this
Tenth Circuit decision will allow nonbank financial institutions to con-
tinue their growth into traditional banking areas.
B. Facts
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956106 was passed "to restrain
the undue concentration of commercial banking resources and to pre-
vent possible abuses related to the control of commercial credit."'
0 7
The definition of a bank depended on the bank's charter under the orig-
inal Act.10 8 Since the Act's passage, the definition of a bank has been
narrowed. In 1966, the charter test was eliminated, and a "bank" was
redefined as an institution which accepts deposits which the depositor
has a legal right to withdraw on demand. 10 9 In 1970, the definition was
further restricted by requiring that the institution must also be engaged
in the business of making commercial loans."10
The Federal Reserve Board was concerned that certain unregulated
nonbank financial institutions were enjoying a competitive advantage
over those institutions regulated as bank holding companies as a result
of these definitional restrictions." ' 1 In an attempt to protect bank hold-
ing companies from the unfair advantages enjoyed by such nonbank
banks, the Board redefined the demand and commercial loan compo-
nents of the statutory provision.'' 2 The intent of this administrative ac-
tion was to regulate nonbank financial institutions, such as Dimension
Financial Corporation, that were offering the functional equivalent of
traditional banking services. 
1 13
102. Revision of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984) provides that the Board's broad
interpretation of the statutory definition of a "bank" include
any institution that accepts deposits that as a matter of practice are payable on de-
mand, and that engages in the business of making any loan other than a loan to
an individual for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes, including
the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of de-
posit, bankers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments. (emphasis
added).
103. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
104. Id. at 1411.
105. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
106. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
107. S. REP. No. 91-1084, 9 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 24 reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5519, 5541.
108. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511 (1956).
109. Pub. L. No. 89-484, 80 Stat. 235 (1966).
110. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
1760 (1970).
111. Revision of Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984).
112. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1985).
113. The types of nonbank financial institutions that the Board was concerned with
included those that offered NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts that do not
give the depositor a legal right to withdraw on demand. In addition, the Board was con-
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C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit invalidated the Federal Reserve Board's at-
tempted regulation of nonbank financial institutions on the ground that
the Board's broad interpretation of the statutory definition of a bank
exceeded the Board's rulemaking authority."14 While acknowledging
that the Board has authority under the Act to make rules and regula-
tions, 115 the court stated that this authority is limited to the degree
"necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of [the
statute] and prevent evasions thereof."' 1 6 The court stated that the def-
erence usually accorded regulatory agencies is based on the assumption
that the regulatory action has been taken to "carry out the particular
purpose of the statute and not to meet other conditions, related or not,
that the agency decides should be changed or regulated."'i 7 The court
found that the Board's new definition of a bank "had nothing to do with
the original meaning of the term nor the then current meaning, but in-
stead was a device to accomplish an end - a change in the Board's juris-
diction."' 18 Since the conditions for permissive regulatory action were
not met, the Board's attempt to implement and enforce the changes in
the regulations were held invalid.' 9
With regard to the demand deposit element of the statutory defini-
tion, the court, relying on its earlier decision in First Bankcorporation v.
Board of Governors,' 20 held that accounts which are subject to withdrawal
upon demand as a practical matter, but not as a right, were not included
in that definition. 12 ' The court stated that the demand deposit element
of the definition was clearly settled in First Bankcorporation, wherein it was
held that an institution which retains a technical prior notice require-
ment before withdrawal of funds, does not, for the purposes of the statu-
tory definition of a bank, accept deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.122 The court more carefully analyzed the
commercial loan element of the statutory definition, and held that the
inclusion of money market transactions within the term "commercial
loans" was not supported by the purpose or legislative history of the
Bank Holding Company Act, nor was the new definition of a "bank" in
accord with common usage of the term in the financial community. 123
cerned with those institutions that were involved in money market transactions. Dimension
Financial Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 683.
114. Dimension Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
744 F.2d 1402, 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982).
116. Dimension Financial Corp., 744 F.2d at 1408.
117. Id. at 1410 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1405.
119. Id. at 1411.
120. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 436, 437.
122. Dimension Financial Corp., 744 F.2d at 1404.
123. Id. at 1406.
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D. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Fed-
eral Reserve Board acted within its rulemaking authority in redefining
banks under the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 4 The Court did not
limit its review to analyzing the commercial loan element of the defini-
tion developed by the Tenth Circuit. Rather, its detailed analysis ex-
tended to the demand deposit element previously developed by the
Tenth Circuit in First Bankcorporation, 125 and summarily relied upon by
the Tenth Circuit's decision below.
In affirming the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Court accepted the
Circuit's rulings on both elements of the definition. 12 6 The Court held
that the Board had not acted within its rulemaking authority in defining
banks subject to regulation under the Bank Holding Company Act, and
that the Board's interpretation of the statutory definition could not be
supported on the asserted basis that it fell within the Act's plain purpose
of regulating institutions functionally equivalent to banks.
127
With regard to the demand deposit element of the definition of a
bank, the Court stated that judicial deference to agency interpretation of
a rule should not be applied in contravention of Congress' express in-
tent. The Court continued:
No amount of agency expertise - however sound may be the
result - can make the words "legal right" mean a right to do
something "as a matter of practice." A legal right to withdraw
on demand means just that: a right to withdraw deposits with-
out prior notice or limitation. . . . The Board's definition of
"demand deposit," therefore, is not an accurate or reasonable
interpretation of § 2(c).
1 2 8
With regard to the commercial loan element of the definition of a
bank, the Court stated that "money market transactions do not fall
within the commonly accepted definition of commercial loans."' 129 Af-
ter a review of the legislative history of the statute and of the Board's
prior position on the definition of a commercial loan, the Court found
nothing to indicate that Congress meant to use the term "commercial
loan" in anything but its accepted usage, and held that the Board's defi-
nition was "not a reasonable interpretation of § 2(c)."'
1 30
The Court concluded by stating that, while regulation of nonbank
banks might be a desirable end, the Act's failure to protect public inter-
ests is "a problem for Congress, and not the Board or the courts, to
address."131
124. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 681, 683 (1986).
125. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
126. Dimension Financial Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 684.
127. Id. at 684, 688, 689.
128. Id. at 686.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 688.




In this decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's
invalidation of an attempt by the Federal Reserve Board to regulate
nonbank financial institutions. Although the opinion focused more on
the rulemaking authority of regulatory agencies than on the banking in-
dustry itself, the effect on banking will be significant nonetheless. The
Court's decision will obviously curtail the Board's ability to eliminate the
competitive advantages presently enjoyed by nonbank banks that are
free from activities regulation. Accordingly, it could be expected that
the continued growth of nonbank banks into traditional banking areas
will cause increased concern on the part of many banks and regulatory
agencies, leading to a call for legislative reform.13 2 Since congressional
action alone can resolve these issues, perhaps the time has come for
legislators to review the matter with an eye towards developing a satis-
factory resolution. Unless Congress does act in this manner, however,
we can expect to see continued rapid change in the structure of financial
institutions and the services they provide.
Bill Van Horn*
IV. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY V. PUEBLO
OF SANTA ANA: THE SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT PUEBLO
INDIANS MAY ALIENATE THEIR LANDS WITHOUT
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
A. Introduction
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Pueblo of Santa
Ana 133 involved the validity of a telephone and telegraph easement
purchased in 1928 by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany (Mountain Bell) from the Pueblo of Santa Ana, in New Mexico.
The dispute centered on apparently conflicting provisions of two stat-
utes. The first statute, the Nonintercourse Act of 1834,134 generally re-
quires a treaty or convention, and thus congressional approval, to
validly alienate Indian lands. The second statute, the Pueblo Lands Act
of 1924135 contains language which had been interpreted by the Secre-
tary of the Interior as allowing the Secretary the authority to approve
132. See generally, Note, The Demise of the Bank-Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregu-
lating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650 (1985); Note, Product
Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision of § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1127 (1985); Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank
Holding Company Acts: An Option for Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. L.J. 89 (1984); Note,
Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposalfor More Permissive Regulation,
97 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1984).
0 The author gratefully acknowledges the writing and editing assistance of Victoria
Parks on Aspen Skiing, Edward J. Posselius III on Philadelphia Gear, and Vincent Oliva on
Dimension Financial.
133. 105 S. Ct. 2587 (1985).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
135. Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (1924).
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alienation of Pueblo lands without congressional approval. This case
involved an alienation approved by the Secretary but not by Congress.
The Pueblo argued that the Nonintercourse Act applied and that
the language of the Pueblo Lands Act did not extinguish the necessity of
congressional approval to alienate Pueblo lands. Mountain Bell con-
tended that the Pueblo Lands Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior,
without the approval of Congress, to approve alienation of Pueblo
lands. The Supreme Court agreed with Mountain Bell and found the
easement valid. In so doing, it interpreted the Pueblo Lands Act under
normal canons of statutory construction rather than the accepted canons
of Indian law construction that had been applied by the district court
and considered by the Tenth Circuit in ruling for the Pueblo.
B. Facts
The subject of the suit was a telephone and telegraph line which
was constructed on a right of way acquired in 1905 by a predecessor to
Mountain Bell. In 1927, the government, on behalf of the Pueblo,
brought a quiet title action to challenge the validity of the easement.
136
The litigation was settled in 1928 when Mountain Bell purchased the
easement from the Pueblo. The transaction was approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, and the company was dismissed from the suit. The
poles and lines were removed in 1980 and the easement was relin-
quished. Shortly thereafter the Pueblo again brought suit; this time a
trespass action against Mountain Bell, seeking compensation for the
time that the poles had been in place.'
3 7
C. Legal Background
The dispute involved two apparently contradictory statutes, the first
being the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 which states: "[n]o purchase,
grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any valid-
ity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution."' 3 8 The second statute, the
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, was enacted by Congress to provide for the
final adjudication and recognition of approximately 3,000 land titles, ac-
136. The United States has historically initiated litigation on behalf of Indians as part
of its trust and guardianship responsibilities. F. COHEN, FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAW 308-11 (1982).
137. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (1985). During the times the poles were
in place, they were used, at least in part, to serve the Pueblo. At the time the suit was
brought, the Indians did not know that the poles had been removed. Had they known, the
suit might not have been brought. Mountain Bell's potential financial liability, in any case,
was small in comparison to that of the Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,
which took an active interest in the litigation. Personal communication with K.M. Krause
(Jan. 17, 1987). The Secretary of the Interior may generally grant rights-of-way for tele-
phone and telegraph lines. 25 U.S.C. § 319 (1982), 25 C.F.R. § 169 (1983). These provi-
sions were not applicable to the easement in question.
138. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 510-22 (discuss-
ing Nonintercourse Act applications and exceptions).
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quired from Pueblo Indians by non-Indians, outside the provisions of
the Nonintercourse Act.' 3 9 The Act also provided for consolidation of
Pueblo lands. The first sixteen sections of the Pueblo Lands Act reme-
died past actions. Section 17 provided a confusing prescription for fu-
ture land alienation.14
0
D. The District Court Opinion
In a short unpublished opinion, 14 1 Judge Edwin L. Mecham of the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held the
easement void and found Mountain Bell liable for trespass. The court
found the statutory language controlling the case to be unclear and ap-
plied accepted canons of Indian law construction which require that stat-
utory ambiguities be resolved in favor of the Indians. 14 2 The court also
found that the previous litigation had no resjudicata or collateral estop-
pel effect.143 Interlocutory appeal of the liability finding was certified.
139. The settlers acquiring the land from the Pueblos relied on the Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877), that the Pueblo Indians were not an
"Indian tribe" within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act and could freely alienate
their lands. The subsequent decision in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913),
disapproved Joseph's distinction of the Pueblo Indians under the Nonintercourse Act and
applied liquor laws to the Pueblos. The disapproval of Joseph placed the titles acquired
from the Pueblo Indians in reliance on Joseph in doubt. This was at least part of the incen-
tive for passage of the Pueblo Lands Act. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 1591-2.
140. The section reads:
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
to which their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall
hereafter be acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico,
or in any other manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale,
grant, lease of any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claims
thereto, made by any Pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a
community of Pueblo Indians, in the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity
in law or in equity unless the same be first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Ch. 331, 43 Stat. 641 (1924) (emphasis added).
141. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., No. 80-
841 (D. N.M. June 2, 1982). The district court's opinion is reproduced in theJoint Appen-
dix to the Petition for Certiorari of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
85-94 (hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix).
142. Joint Appendix, supra note 141, at 90, 92. See infra note 161 and accompanying
text. Professor Cohen points out that:
The rules for construing federal statutes in Indian affairs have a pervasive influ-
ence in Indian law. The canons are variously phrased in different contexts, but
generally they provide for a broad construction when the issue is whether Indian
rights are reserved or established, and for a narrow construction when Indian
rights are to be abrogated or limited. These canons play an essential role in im-
plementing the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes and
are involved in most of the subject matter of Indian law.
F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 224-25 (discussing canons of construction). Numerous
Supreme Court cases have used the canons to resolve cases in favor of Indians. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (cited in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 734 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), by the Court of
Appeals in resolving statutory ambiguities in favor of the Indians); United States ex rel.
Haulpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (cited by the Supreme
Court dissent in Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2609, for proposition that alienation of
Indian property is not to be "lightly implied" (quoting ex rel. Haulpai Indians, 314 U.S. at
354)). See generally, Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth "-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 601, 634-45 (1975).
143. Joint Appendix, supra, note 141, at 92.
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E. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed Mountain Bell's appeal
and upheld the decision of the district court in all respects. 14 4 Judge
Breitenstein 1 4 5 traced much of the history of the Pueblo Indians as well
as court decisions concerning the tribe. He noted that the Tenth Circuit
had previously applied the Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos three
times. 146 In holding that it applied in this case, he noted that while the
legislative history of section 17 was ambiguous, the mandate of congres-
sional approval for alienation of Pueblo lands was not ambiguous. He
further reasoned that even if there was some ambiguity, the accepted
canon of Indian law that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions be-
ing resolved in favor of the Indians .. " would mandate resolution in
favor of the Pueblo. 147 Prior administrative interpretation of section 17
and any resjudicata effect of the prior suit were unpersuasive in the face
of what the court perceived as the clear mandate of section 17 for secre-
tarial and congressional approval of any alienation of Pueblo lands. 1
48
F. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Stevens, 149 held that the Nonintercourse Act of 1834
does not apply to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, thereby allowing
them to alienate their lands without congressional approval. 150 Like the
Tenth Circuit, the Court traced the history leading up to the passage of
the Pueblo Lands Act. They also described the title clearing actions that
occurred as a result of the Act, including the 1927 suit challenging the
144. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co, 734 F.2d
1402 (10th Cir. 1984).
145. Other members of the panel included Judge McWilliams and Judge Logan.
146. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1404-05. In the previous applications of the
Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos, as here, the Tenth Circuit had interpreted United
States v. Sandoval as specifically overruling United States v. Joseph and generally applying
the Nonintercourse Act to the Pueblos. In the present case, the Supreme Court described
the holding of Sandoval as restricted to the application of liquor laws, alienation issues
being addressed only by implication. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2596; see supra note
138.
147. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1406-07 (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.
373, 392 (1976)); see supra note 142.
148. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1406-07. The arguments of resjudicata and estop-
pel were, in part, rejected because the previous dismissal of Mountain Bell was not by
formal court action, but rather by letter. In fact, the suit involving the easement was only
one of many property interests that were being adjudicated as a result of the Pueblo Lands
Act. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Apparently the letter was only a matter of
convenience and it was assumed that other more formally treated cases to which Mountain
Bell was a party would provide adequate documentation of the procedures involved. Per-
sonal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
149. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice White in the majority. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
150. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598.
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easement. 15 1 The Court apparently found neither the plain language of
section 17 nor its legislative history clearly determinative of congres-
sional intent. Instead, resolution rested on a choice between two statu-
tory construction arguments.1
5 2
First, the majority reasoned that an interpretation of section 17 re-
quiring congressional approval to alienate Pueblo lands would nullify
the effect of section 16. The intent of section 16 was to provide a rela-
tively expeditious method of consolidating Pueblo holdings by selling
some holdings and buying others. To facilitate this, the terms of section
16 required only secretarial approval of these transactions. The Court
felt that if section 17 generally required congressional approval for
alienation, it would also require such approval for transactions under
section 16 and, consequently, impede its expeditious purpose. Accord-
ingly, the canon that "a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative" applied to eliminate the congressional approval
requirement. 153 There was no discussion, however, of canons that
might dictate a different result, for example, that section 16 might be a
specific provision overriding the more general mandate of section 17.154
The second, and more important statutory construction rationale
applied was that "[t]he uniform and contemporaneous view of the Exec-
utive Officer responsible for administering the statute and the district
court with exclusive jurisdiction over the quiet title actions brought
under the Pueblo Lands Act 'is entitled to very great respect.' -155 The
Court seemed particularly deferential to the interpretation given the
Pueblo Lands Act by agencies and courts immediately after its passage
when the main title clearing provisions of the Act were being executed.
The Court said that judges considering such matters fifty years later,
should defer to this interpretation. 1
56
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dis-
sented. The dissent parallels the structure of the Tenth Circuit and ma-
jority opinions by tracing the history of the Pueblo Lands Act and its
subsequent application. 157 The dissent made a credible case that the
statutory structure and legislative history could support application of
the Nonintercourse Act's requirement of congressional approval and
151. Id. at 2590-95.
152. The Court nowhere directly stated that the statutory language is ambiguous, but
hints at ambiguity when it states that two "constructions find some support in the lan-
guage of § 17." Id. at 1590. In any case, a discussion of statutory construction is not
generally applied where there is no authority. See SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CoNsT.
§ 45.02 (4th ed. 1984).
153. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
154. See, e.g., D. Ginsberg Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932).
155. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2597 (quoting Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)).
156. Id. at 2597-98.
157. Id. at 2599-2602 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that past administrative construction was not very consistent.15 8
The most notable difference is the application of the canons of In-
dian law construction which would normally restrict alienation of Indian
lands and favor Indians where ambiguities clouded statutory interpreta-
tion.159 It was in these areas that the dissent particularly disagreed with
the majority's legal analysis. In spite of the rationalizations of statutory
consistency and deference to administrative interpretation used by the
majority, the dissent argued that, recognizing the ambiguity in section
17, the majority should have used the accepted Indian law canons to
come to a different conclusion.
160
G. Analysis and Conclusion
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Pueblo of Santa Ana
represents one more in a series of recent Supreme Court decisions re-
jecting use of the canons of Indian law construction on behalf of tribes
in their attempts to gain commercial or monetary advantage over parties
other than the federal government. 1 6 1 Though neither the Supreme
Court opinion nor the lower courts discussed the equity of having the
utility pay for an easement for the third time, this could not have been
totally ignored in the deliberations of the Justices. 16 2 It seems clear
from both majority and dissenting opinions that the peculiarities of In-
dian law were not given great weight by the Supreme Court decision.
163
On the other hand, the Court did not totally abandon the special
protections accorded Indians by outwardly applying concepts of law
normally applicable in a commercial situation. 164 The analysis relied to-
tally on interpretation of the statutes involved, not on concepts of the
parties' intent or estoppel that might have come into play in a commer-
cial contract litigation. The dealings of Indians, especially in matters
158. Id. at 2602-08 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
159. See supra note 142.
160. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2217, 2220 (1986) (allowing abrogation
of treaty rights based on implication from legislative history); South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 106 S. Ct. 2039 (1986) (The Tribe argued that application of the
Nonintercourse Act voided titles of non-Indians who had purchased land from the Tribe,
thus they could claim a 225 square mile area. The argument was defeated by application
of a statutory construction that did not apply the Indian law canons. General statutory
construction applied in Pueblo of Santa Ana was cited. The circuit court decision, which was
favorable to the Tribe, was described in Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. Kla-
math Indian Tribe, 105 S. Ct. 3420, 3432 (1985) (discussing Indian law canons, but decid-
ing that their use was precluded by "fair appraisal" of other statutory construction aids);
United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) (using reference to common law in construing
the word "payment" rather than Indian law canons); Note, Tribal Property: Defending the
Parameters of the Federal Trust Relationship under the Non-Intercourse Act, Catawba Indian Tribe
v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983), 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 101 (1985). The
favorable impact of Indian law canons on the circuit court decision that was reversed is
mentioned in Foot, United States v. Dann: What it Portends for Ownership of Millions ofAcres in
the Western United States. 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 183 (1984).
162. The question of triple payment was raised from the bench during oral argument
before the Supreme Court. Personal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
163. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. See F. COHEN, supra note 136, at 650-51 (discussing Federal wardship of Indians).
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concerning Indian lands, still seem to be very much a creature of federal
statute.
The applicability of more general statutory construction practice in
Indian cases is still very much in question. For example, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,165 used Indian law
canons in holding that a tribe could force a federal agency to abandon
its longstanding interpretation and apply a more favorable royalty calcu-
lation method for natural gas produced on a reservation. 166 The
Supreme Court's opinion in Pueblo of Santa Ana was advanced as a reason
for reversal of the Tenth Circuit decision both on rehearing and in a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 1 6 7 In neither case was it
persuasive.
Perhaps, as the dissent argues, this case should be restricted to
those few situations falling under the Pueblo Lands Act, for there is
nothing in the majority opinion specifying broader application. Never-
theless, it is hard to believe that Indians are not going to become more
and more sophisticated and more incorporated into the commercial and
economic life of society at large. When assimilation is complete, it
seems inconceivable that courts will alter basic precepts of law, such as
canons of statutory construction, so as to grant Indians commercial ad-
vantage. Perhaps Pueblo of Santa Ana is one small step towards the recog-
nition of Indian equality in commercial dealings and before the
courts. 168
Eric Twelker
165. 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 728 F.2d 1555 (1984), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 471 (1986).
166. 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam decision adopting the dis-
senting opinion ofJustice Seymour inJicarilla Apache Tribe, 728 F.2d at 1555 (1986)).
167. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Southland Royalty Co. v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 471 (1986).
168. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted that "[ciharacteristically, it is non-Indian
entities such as Petitioner and amici who argue for 'emancipation' of the Pueblos." Pueblo
of Santa Ana, 105 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (quoting Brief for Respondant Pueblo). There is some
indication that Indian arguments for more rights in some situations and less rights in
others will not continue to receive unquestioning acceptance from the courts. Justice Mar-
shall, in questioning from the bench during oral argument asked, in a tone expressing
incredulity, if counsel for the Pueblo was really asking for restraints on alienation of
Pueblo property. Personal communication with K.M. Krause (Jan. 17, 1987).
1987]

